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The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed pnvate patenting of
inventions discovered with federally-funded research. Congress
balanced that significant benefit to private entities by empowenng the
government to 'arch in"and grant a license to another manufacturer
when the license holder has not made the invention available to the
public on reasonable terms. Bayh-Dole also allows march-in when
necessary to alleviate health or safety needs. Remarkably, federal
agencies have not once exercised these rights since Bayh-Dole's
passage, even in the face of significant problems with access to
medicines discovered with federal funding This Article argues that
the current medicines pricing and access crisis, highlighted by the
inaccessibility of an effective prostate cancer drug discovered by
government funding, calls for the US agencies to finally fulfill the
terms of the Act
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 states a clear objective to "protect
the public against ... unreasonable use of inventions" that owe their
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origins to federally-funded research. The Act empowers the
government to "march in" and grant a license to another manufacturer
if the license holder has not made the invention available to the public
on reasonable terms or if the action is necessary to alleviate health or
safety needs.
Yet, decades of determined advocacy by holders of licenses on
federally-funded inventions, in particular holders of medicine patents,
has led to relevant federal agencies not even once exercising the
rights granted to them by Congress, even in the face of significant
problems with access to medicines discovered with federal funding.
This Article outlines the clear language of the Act, and the legislative
intent behind it, and argues that the current medicines pricing and
access crisis calls for the U.S. government to finally fulfill the terms
of the Act.
A review of the case of the highly effective prostate cancer drug
enzalutimade, marketed under the name Xtandi, provides an
instructive case study. Xtandi is a medicine discovered with federal
funding, now patented by private entities who charge exorbitant
prices to the federal government and taxpayer patients who paid for
its discovery. The U.S. should exercise its Bayh-Dole march-in rights
for Xtandi, and in other cases where medicine whose discovery was
federally-funded is not available on reasonable terms.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of
1980,' commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act, was born out of a
worry that the United States was falling behind in innovation and that
there was not a standard procedure for determining ownership of
intellectual property that was developed under federal funding.2
Before 1980, procedure on electing title to the invention was largely
left up to the federal agencies. 3 Agencies that provided funding had
differing policies. Some retained ownership, making the invention
public domain, while others allowed for the inventors to take title.4
Procedures became standardized with the passage of the Bayh-Dole
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
2. Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions:
Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In, 109 Nw. U. L. REv. 1083, 1087 (2015).
3. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price ofProgress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost
43 HOus. L. REv. 1373, 1378 (2007).
4. Id.
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Act. Since 1980, entities that have received federal funding in the
process of discovery and invention have been allowed to patent their
inventions after giving notice to the government.5 The Act also
authorized the federal government to retain certain rights in the
invention. These include march-in rights and royalty free licenses,
which will be discussed in greater detail below.
A. Perceived Need for Incentives to Develop Federally-
Supported Inventions
The Act was named after two of its main proponents, Senators
Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) and Robert Dole (R-Kan.). It was signed into law
by President Jimmy Carter in December 1980. Section 200 of the Act
describes the policy and objective behind the Act in full, but can be
briefly summarized as the intent on the behalf of Congress to utilize
the patent system in the U.S. to foster collaboration between private
industry and nonprofit organizations in order to fully commercialize
inventions made under federal funding, and to ensure that such
inventions are available to the public. 6 In 1983, President Ronald
Reagan furthered this initiative by way of a presidential memorandum
that expanded those allowed to patent a federally funded invention to
include federal government contractors. 7 Previously, as its formal title
implies, the Act only reached nonprofit organizations, such as
universities, and small businesses.8
In the late 1970s, when the bill was being drafted, approximately
fifty percent of all U.S. scientific research was federally funded. 9 The
majority of the funding agencies required that patent ownership rights
were conceded to the federal government, regardless of the amount of
federal funding contributed. 0 Yet, while the government owned an
extensive catalog of patents, only approximately four percent of those
patents were actually licensed." Legislators sought to remedy this
5. See Id. at 1375 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3) and "giving notice" to the
government).
6. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West 2000).
7. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT 6 (2016).
8. Id
9. Whalen, supra note 2, at 1087.
10. Id at 1087-1088.
11. The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S 414
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
174 54:171
BETTER LATE THANNEVER
problem. They believed that allowing the inventor to patent the
invention and then license the intellectual property would provide the
proper economic incentive to both inventor and licensee, leading to
the full commercial development of the invention. 12 Drafters of the
Bayh-Dole Act were also under the impression that the Act would
spur innovation in private industry because firms would no longer be
afraid to accept federal funding for research on account of the
invention being deemed public domain, and thus unprofitable to
investors. 13
Following the enactment, universities began patenting their
inventions developed under federal funding instead of placing them in
public domain.1 4 Today, many universities assume the costs of the
patent application with the hope that the patented invention will
eventually garner enough interest from a private firm that the firm
will want to acquire a license to the intellectual property rights."
Universities are then able to enter into a license agreement with the
private firm and generate license revenue and possible royalties for
the university if the invention becomes commercially successful.
1. Is this premise correct?
Although the necessity argument for the Bayh-Dole Act was
based on the premise that new incentives were needed to spur
development of federally-funded inventions, the historical record calls
into question the accuracy of that premise. Research about academic
institution-industry relationships regarding innovation in the first half
of the 2 0 th Century demonstrates that patent and licensing agreements
between the two were gaining momentum long before 1980.16
Initially, universities were reluctant to patent inventions that arose out
of academic and faculty research because universities worried that
failure to place the invention in the public domain would harm their
reputation.1 7 However, following the Great Depression, many
institutions began to change their stance on the subject as they
became eager to find a path to increased revenue.' 8 During the 1930s
12. Whalen, supra note 2, at 1088.
13. Id.
14. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 3, at 1381-1382.
15. Id.
16. See David Mowery & Bhaven Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates
in the USA, 1925-1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781 (2001).
17. Id. at 782,785.
18. Id. at 787.
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alone, over a dozen prominent research universities developed patent
portfolios and policies. 19
The onset of World War II saw a dramatic rise in federal funding
of research and development in the United States, especially in the
biomedical field.20 Previous to the war, funding was provided by state
level sources, industry, or the Department of Agriculture.21
Federally-funded research and development resulted in increased
patenting by universities, particularly in the 1970s. Universities and
industry alike began to view biomedical patents as a lucrative
investment opportunity, and the substantial rise in intellectual
property licensing agreements between the two in the 1970s reflected
that perspective. 22
Supporters of the Bayh-Dole Act, arguing that more economic
incentives were needed to bring inventions to market, pointed to the
small amount of the government's patent portfolio-only five-percent
by the late 1970s-that was licensed and fully commercialized.
However, the majority of the patents held by the government at that
time had been developed under federal defense contracts where the
private contractors had declined to pursue title rights.2 3 Thus, the low
number of government patents holding licensing agreements was a
result of private contractors concluding that such inventions usually
were not directed for civilian use or appropriate for
commercialization.24
B. Terms of the Act
As aforementioned, the Bayh-Dole Act added certain safeguards
to protect against the misuse of federally funded patented inventions.
Section 200 makes clear that one of the objectives of the Bayh-Dole
19. Id. at 789 (referring to Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, California,
Columbia, Harvard, Pennsylvania, MIT, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Yale, Stanford,
Chicago, and California Institute of Technology).
20. Id. at 793 ("[F]ederal funds for basic research in US universities increased sevenfold
during the 1958-1968 period. The greatest increased in funding in the late 1950s and 1960s
were in the biomedical sciences, funded largely by the Department of Health and Human
Services, which housed the National Institutes of Health.").
21. 1d. at 789.
22. Id. at 793-794.
23. Id at 797 ("Advocates of patents on university research overlooked the fact that title
to most of these patents, which resulted from federal defense contracts, had been ceded to the





Act is "to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in
federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this
area."25 These statutory rights are march-in rights and royalty free
licenses.
1. March-In Rights
Section 203 of the Bayh-Dole Act addresses march-in rights. It
states that the federal agency that funded the invention retains the
right to "require the contractor, an assignee or exclusive licensee of a
subject invention to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or
exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant or
applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances,
and if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such
request, to grant such a license itself." In order to use this provision,
though, the federal agency must determine that one of four conditions
is met that necessitates agency action. These conditions include:
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or
assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve
practical application of the subject invention in such
field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety
needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the
contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public
use specified by Federal regulations and such
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the
contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required
by section 204 has not been obtained or waived or
because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell
any subject invention in the United states is in breach
of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204.26
25. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West 2000).
26. 35 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(1)-(4) (West 2000).
2017] 177
WZLLAMETTELA WREVZEW
To give the funding agency more guidance, the Bayh-Dole Act
defines practical application, a term used within the first condition, as
[T]o manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to
practice in the case of a process or method, or to operate in the
case of a machine or system; and, in each case, under such
conditions as to establish that the invention is being utilized and
that its benefits are to the extent permitted by law or Government
regulations available to the public on reasonable terms.2 7
In effect, march-in rights allow the federal agency that funded
the invention to march-in on the organization that holds the patent
title and issue a license to the patent to another organization.28 The
new patent license holder would be able to make use of the
intellectual property rights without fear of patent infringement, but
would be required to make royalty payments to the patent holder.2 9
2. Royalty-Free Licenses
The Bayh-Dole Act offers another protection to the public
against the unreasonable use of federally-funded patents in the form
of royalty-free licenses. These licensing rights are also retained by the
federal government and are identified in Section 202(c)(4) of the Act.
Specifically, this provision grants the funding agency a
"nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid up license to
practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any
subject invention throughout the world." 3 0 Thus, any organization that
elects to take title to and patent an invention that was researched and
developed under federal funding acknowledges that the federal
government retains this right in the invention.
Unlike march-in rights, the agency is not required to first make a
determination that any circumstances are met before it is allowed to
exercise its licensing rights under this section.31 Agencies also are not
27. 35 U.S.C.A. § 201(f) (West 2000).
28. Thomas, supra note 7, at 7.
29. Id. at 7-8.
30. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(4) (West 2000).
31. James Love, Differences Between the March-in, Royalty Free Right, and




required to make royalty payments to the patent holder should they
decide to use their rights.
3. Other Federal Licensing Rights
There is also an additional, alternative route that the government
can take when dealing with patent-protected inventions in the United
States. It is not found within the Bayh-Dole Act, and therefore federal
funding of the invention is not a prerequisite to government rights. 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides for use of a United States patented
invention by the federal government or an authorized government
contractor. In order to exercise this statutory right, the patent must be
"used or manufactured by or for the United States." 32 Commentators
have compared this licensing right to the government's ability to
exercise eminent domain when real property is needed for the
common good.33 If the federal government decided to go this route,
the patent holder's only remedy would be to file suit against the
United States seeking damages for the government's use of the
patent. 34
III. PRICING, HEALTH NEEDS, AND MARCH-IN UNDER BAYH-DOLE
As noted above, the Bayh-Dole Act both acknowledges concerns
about public access to federally-funded inventions and includes legal
mechanisms for ensuring that access. In furtherance of the Act's
objective to "protect the public against . .. unreasonable use of
inventions," 35 the government is empowered to "march in" and grant
a license to another manufacturer if the license holder has not made
"practical application" of the invention.36
Practical application is defined as making the invention
"available to the public on reasonable terms." 37 March-in rights can
32. Id.
33. See Amy Kapczynski & Aaron Kesselheim, Government Patent Use: A Legal
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 793 (2016); see also Zain Rizvi
et al., Opinion, A Simple Way for the Government to Curb Inflated Drug Pices, WASH. POST
(May 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-simple-way-for-the-government
-to-curb-inflated-drug-prices/2016/05/12/ed89c9b4-16fc-l I e6-aa55-670cabef46e0 story.html?
utmterm=.d956d107de9b.
34. Thomas, supra note 7, at 8.
35. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West 2000).
36. 35 U.S.C.A. § 203(1) (West 2000).
37. 35 U.S.C.A. § 201(f) (West 2000).
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also be asserted when the "action is necessary to alleviate health or
safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied" by the license
holder.38
It does not take sophisticated legal analysis to decipher the plain
meaning of phrases like "reasonable terms" and "health and safety
needs." It is well-settled law that words in statutes should be
interpreted in line with their ordinary meaning. 39 Yet, decades of
determined advocacy by holders of licenses on federally-funded
inventions, in particular holders of medicine patents, has led to
relevant federal agencies not even once exercising the rights granted
to them by Congress. 4 0 So, even though the meaning of the terms is
plain to see, it is important to review the reasons why the
unaffordable pricing of medicines and the resulting health crisis
provide the foundation for the exercise of long-dormant Bayh-Dole
march-in rights.
A. Legislative Intent on March-In Authority and Reasonable
Price
In 2001, Professors Peter Arno and Michael Davis provided the
definitive explanation for how and why the Bayh-Dole Act's march-
in rights are clearly triggered by the license holder failing to make the
federally-funded invention available to the public at a reasonable
price:
[M]arch-in rights were preserved, with their
requirement that practical application defined as
availability to the public on "reasonable terms" be
achieved. There was never any doubt that this meant
the control of profits, prices, and competitive
conditions. There are countless references in the
legislative record to the need to maintain competitive
market conditions through the exercise of march-in
rights.4 1
38. 35 U.S.C.A. § 203(2) (West 2000).
39. "Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose." Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175-76 (2009) (quoting Engine Mfrs.
Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).
40. See infra Section IV (this Article's discussion of refusal of NIH to exercise march-in
and pharma influence on agency).
41. Peter S. Amo & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
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As Professors Amo and Davis state, there is indeed an
abundance of evidence that the Bayh-Dole Act's march-in provisions
were devised to ensure that federally-funded inventions be available
to the public at reasonable prices. An analysis of that evidence should
begin with the recognition that the legislation, as proposed,
represented a significant shift in government practice. Federal
government investment in research during World War II, and beyond,
was subject to a clear requirement that the public interest requires that
all rights to such inventions be assigned to the Government, and not
left to the private ownership of the contractor.4 2
The change to this settled approach proposed by Bayh-Dole was
jarring to many, and outright offensive to some. Senator Russell Long
of Louisiana said of the bill that he saw "absolutely no reason why the
taxpayer should be forced to subsidize a private monopoly and have
to pay twice: first for the research and development and then through
monopoly prices."4 3 Admiral H.G Rickover testified to Congress that
the proposal was a multi-billion dollar "giveaway," a view that
members of Congress acknowledged was widely held.4 Consumer
advocates and anti-trust lawyers rang alarm bells.45 A Department of
Justice review of the legislation emphasized the need to provide
"adequate protection of the public's equitable interest in inventions
that result from government funding."46 Witnesses testifying to
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed
Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV.
631, 662 (2001).
42. Arr'Y GEN. OF THE U.S., INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES
AND POLICIES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE
PRESIDENT (1947), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC AND INT'L SCI. PLANNING AND
ANALYSIS OF THE H. COMM. ON SCI. AND TECH., 94TH Cong., 2 BACKGROUND MATERIALS
ON GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY: THE OWNERSHIP OF INVENTIONS RESULTING FROM
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: REP. OF COMM., COMM'N & MAJOR
STUDIES, at 22 (Comm. Print 1976).
43. Patent Policy J Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. & the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 464 (1980).
44. Hearings on S. 1215 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 96th Cong. 401 (1979); 126 CONG. REC. 29,898 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Brown) ("I am aware of the concern that granting contractors exclusive
rights to federally funded inventions is a 'give-away' of the taxpayers' property.").
45. Jennifer A. Henderson & John. J. Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh-Dole
Act: An Implied Duty to Commercialize, CTR. FOR INTEGRATION MED. & INNOVATIVE TECH.
3 (Oct. 2002), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.453.1958&rep=repl
&type=pdf.
46. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearings on HR. 6933 Before a
Subcomm. of the H Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. 97 (1980) (testimony of Ky P.
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Congress emphasized the need for the final version of the bill to
include safeguards ensuring that federally-funded inventions would
be available at a reasonable price and preserve the right of the
government to intervene if the "market price is unreasonable."4 7
Bill co-sponsor Senator Birch Bayh was well aware of these
concerns, and insisted that the legislation acknowledged and
addressed them:
[Bill criticism] comes from those that feel that this bill
is a front to allow the large, wealthy, corporation to
take advantage of Government research and thus to
profit at taxpayer's expense. We thought we had
drafted the bill in such a way that this was not
possible.4 8
The provision of the bill that members of Congress believed
would protect the taxpaying public was the march-in provision, with
Bayh's co-sponsor Senator Robert Dole going on record to say that
march-in rights were designed to "diffuse the danger of
monopolies." 4 9 A multitude of witnesses echoed the co-sponsors'
statements, testifying that march-in rights were the designated
protection for the public interest, particularly against monopolies'
impact on market pricing.s0 As U.S. Comptroller Elmer B. Staats
Ewing, Jr.).
47. Government Patent Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic & Int'1
Scientific Planning & Analysis of the H Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 94th Cong. 785 (1976)
(supplemental materials of William 0. Quesenberry).
48. 1979 S. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 44 (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh).
49. 126 CONG. REC. 8,739 (1980) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole).
50. See 1979 S. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 44 (statement of
Elmer B. Staats, U.S. Comptroller Gen.); id. at 70 (statement of Dr. Hector F. DeLuca,
Chairman, Biochemistry Dept., University of Wisconsin Madison); id at 187 (statement of
Howard Bremer, President, Society of University Patent Administrators); Patent Policy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 96th Cong. 182 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings] (statement of
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Deputy Gen. Counsel, NASA); id. at 366 (statement of Dale W.
Church, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Policy); Government Patent
Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research and Tech. of the H Comm. on Sci.
and Tech., 96th Cong. 54 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Sci. Hearings] (statement of John E.
Maurer, Director, Patent Dept., Monsanto Corp.); id at 182 (statement of Ralph L. Davis,
Purdue Research Found.); Government Patent Policies: Healing Before S. Small Business
Comm., 95th Cong. 189-195 (statement of John H. Shenefield, Asst. Att'y Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
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testified to the Senate, "march-in rights to protect the public's interest
were developed to take care of and address the patent policy issues of
contractor's windfall profits, suppression of technology, and the
detrimental effects to competition from granting contractors rights to
inventions."
In fact, march-in rights under Bayh-Dole actually represented a
legislative compromise that further demonstrates the rights' clear
meaning. A proposed pro-taxpayer "pay-back provision" that would
have required license holders to compensate the government out of
profits was rejected.52 But so was the industry's spirited opposition to
march-in rights and request that the "reasonable terms" requirement
be removed or neutralized.53 The final legislation's retention of
march-in rights despite these repeated industry objections is
significant evidence that Congress fully intended march-in rights to
be what the statute's plain meaning says they are: protection for the
public's access to the inventions its tax dollars paid for.
Although industry representatives argue today that pricing
cannot trigger march-in rights,5 4 they conceded this point at the time
of Bayh-Dole's passage. A former Assistant Secretary of Commerce-
turned-corporate representative told the Senate that march-in
provisions protected not just against non-use of the invention but also
against "abuse" of the monopolies that were detrimental to "the
welfare of the people."5 s Henry F. Manbeck, General Patent Counsel
for General Electric Company, made it even more clear, saying of
march-in rights, "[I]f [a contractor] fails to supply the market
adequately at a fair pice, then there is reason for requiring it to
51. 1979 S. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 56 (statement of Elmer
B. Staats, U.S. Comptroller Gen.).
52. 1979 S. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 8-10, 25-26 (1979).
53. 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings, supra note 50, at 221 (statement of Peter F. McCloskey)
(industry request to make the "reasonable terms" requirement not apply if "the invention is
being worked.").
54. How THE BAYH-DOLE ACT PROPELLED U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP IN LIFE
SCIENCES, 22-26, http://phrmacdn.connectionsmedia.com/sites/default/files/pdf/bayh-dole-
act-white-paper-summary.pdf (last viewed February 11, 2017).
55. DAVID HALPERIN, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND MARCH-IN RIGHTs 6 (2001),
http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/norvir/halperinmarchin2001.pdf; see also 1979 S.
Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 153-154 (testimony of Betsy Ancker-
Johnson, Vice President, Gen. Motors Environmental. Activities Staff, Former Assistant
Secretary of Commerce).
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license both the background patents and the patents stemming from
the contract work."5 6
B. Other Analyses ofMarch-In Rights
Since Arno's and Davis' seminal article, multiple legal and
public policy experts have weighed in with their agreement that the
Bayh-Dole march-in provisions clearly contemplate government
licensure when the license holder takes advantage of its monopoly to
set unaffordable prices on the federally-funded invention. Those
analysts have concurred that unreasonable pricing violates the Act's
"reasonable terms" requirement under Section 203(1) and, in
instances of health-related technology such as medicines, can invoke
the health and safety protections that are the subject of Section
203(2).
Among those who have signed onto this view in the years since
Bayh-Dole's passage was legislation co-sponsor former Senator
Bayh. In 1997, former Senator Bayh filed a petition with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services requesting a march-in
license for Cell-Pro, Inc. to use technology discovered with federal
funding and licensed to Johns Hopkins University. In that petition,
former Senator Bayh argued that march-in was justified in part due to
concerns about prices paid by consumers for the invention, citing
"unreasonably high royalties and prices of medical care."58
There have been arguments over the years arguing for an
interpretation of march-in rights that is so narrow that it reduces
pricing to irrelevancy. 59 But, as one journalist recently noted, "it is
also fair to say that most of the attorneys who make this argument
represent drug companies."60 Unfortunately, that group includes the
56. 1979 House Sci. Hearings, supra note 50, at 48 (emphasis added).
57. See Halperin, supra note 55; see also University Research and the Patent System:
Heaing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Robert
Weissman, Director, Essential Action), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-10-
24WeissmanTestimony.pdf; Thopher Sipro et al., Enough Is Enough: The Time Has Come to
Address Sky-f-ugh Drug Pices, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, 27-28 (September 18, 2015),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/15131852/DrugPricingReforms-
reporti.pdf.
58. James Love, Birch Bayh's competing interests and evolving views, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT'L (August 23, 2012, 7:07 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1 537.
59. John H. Rabitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing - A New Twist for
March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J 149 (2005).
60. Alicia Mundy, Just the Medicine: How the next president can lower drug prices with
the stroke ofa pen, WASH. MONTHLY (November/December 2016), http://washingtonmonthly
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bill's two co-sponsors, in their post-Senate iterations as industry
lobbyists, with Bayh directly reversing course from his 1997 position.
While working either directly for pharmaceutical companies (Dole) or
a law firm representing pharmaceutical companies (Dole and Bayh),
they wrote a 2002 letter to the editor of the Washington Post claiming
that they never intended pricing to be a factor that could invoke
march-in rights.61
Financial inducements aside, it is difficult to sustain a straight-
faced argument that "reasonable terms" does not include the price
charged for the invention. As University of Michigan law professor
Nicholas Bagley put it in 2015, echoing the generations of
jurisprudence on statutory interpretation:
[It is] a powerful and straightforward argument that
the federal government could conclude that a drug is
"not available on reasonable terms" if its price is
exorbitant. In contract negotiations, price is a term.
Indeed, it is often the most important term. Why
would you read a statute written like that
to exclude any consideration of prices? 62
As Professor Bagley and others have noted, the terms of the law
are plain enough in isolation. But, taken as a whole, they even more
clearly call for the consideration of price of the monopoly-protected
invention. The arguments made against "reasonable terms", including
price, hold that the only Bayh-Dole requirement of a license holder is
to make the invention commercially available. 63 Unfortunately, that
interpretation seems to also form the basis of several National
Institutes of Health decisions rejecting march-in petitions, more fully
described in Section IV.
That interpretation violates a rule of statutory construction as
well-settled as the ordinary meaning rule: all words of a statute should
be considered to have a purpose, and should be given effect.6 If
.com/magazine/novemberdecember-2016/just-the-medicine/.
61. Birch Bayh & Bob Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner, WASH.
POST (April 11, 2002).
62. Nicholas Bagley, Pushing back on exorbitant drug pices, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(September 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/pushing-back-
on-exorbitant-drug-prices/.
63. Rabitschek & Latker, supra note 59, at 160.
64. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175-76 (2009). Beyond simply
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Congress had intended the only obligation of the license holder to be
making the invention commercially available, it would have
concluded its definition of "practical application" with the
requirement contained there that the invention be "available to the
public." 65 But Congress did not stop there. It added to the definition
the mandate that the invention not just be available but must be so "on
reasonable terms." 66 Clearly, mere commercialization of the invention
is not sufficient to meet a license holder's obligations.
C Health and Safety Needs and March-In
Most of the scholarly and policy debates about Bayh-Dole
march-in have focused on the pricing component of the "reasonable
terms" requirement under Sections 201(f) and 203(1). But, the
medicines pricing and access crisis outlined in Section VI of this
Article just as clearly call for march-in to be exercised under the
"health and safety needs" justification included in Section 203(2). In
fact, even scholars who argue that "reasonable terms" does not
include pricing concede that high medicine prices could justify a
health-related march-in.67
During the Bayh-Dole hearings, one expert intellectual property
and government attorney specifically referenced cancer treatment in
this context:
Whenever you discuss patent policy, you very quickly
come up with the question of what do you do with a
cure for cancer? Are you going to let one company
have that? Obviously, a priceless invention ... The
Government might need to acquire title, because that
would be an exceptional circumstance.6 8
ignoring the phrase "reasonable terms," it is similarly impossible to coherently argue that
"reasonable terms" does not include consideration of pricing, given the abundant case and
regulatory law. See Arno & Davis, supra note 41, at 650-652, and legislative history, supra
notes 48-57, showing it does.
65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 201(f) (West 2000).
66. Id.
67. Rabitschek & Latker, supra note 59, at 167.
68. Patent Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the




As is more fully discussed in Section VI, the scenario imagined in the
late 1970s is reality today. Recent decades have seen historic
breakthroughs in cancer treatment in particular, thanks in significant
part to federal funding that led to these inventions.69 Yet, those
medicines are not available to all, including U.S. taxpayers. The cost
of cancer medicine in the U.S. exceeds $100,000 per patient per year,
and U.S. oncologists report that one in five of their patients do not fill
prescriptions due to cost.70 The current situation, as illustrated by the
Xtandi pricing and access crisis described in Section VI, is a perfect
match for the scenario anticipated by the "health and safety needs"
march-in option.
When faced with similar significant needs in the past, the U.S.
government has not hesitated to take, or at least threaten to take,
compulsory licensing such as that enabled by the Bayh-Dole march-in
provisions. The most high-profile example occurred in 2001, when
the U.S. was confronted with the purposeful spread of the deadly
infectious disease anthrax. Envelopes containing anthrax spores,
postmarked September 18, 2001, were mailed to major U.S.-based
media outlets. Two more infected envelopes, these post-marked
October 9, 2011, were mailed to two U.S. Senators. Twenty-two
people were infected with anthrax due to the mailings, and five died.
The only approved oral treatment for anthrax was the antibiotic
ciprofloxacin, patented and marketed in the U.S. by Bayer
Corporation under the name Cipro. This appeared to present a
problem: there was a limited supply of Cipro in the U.S., and the price
was thirty times higher than in nations where generic versions were
available. 72
The response by the U.S. government was swift. Tommy
Thompson, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, demanded that Bayer significantly discount the
price of Cipro. If Bayer failed to do so, Thompson vowed to seek
69. Enhancing Drug Discovery and Development NAT'L CANCER INST. (Sept. 11,
2015), https://www.cancer.gov/research/areas/treatment/enhancing-drug-discovery.
70. Ayalew Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven Initiative and Petition to Lower
the High Cost of Cancer Drugs, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 966, 997 (2015), http://www.mayo
clinicproceedings.org/article/SO025-6196(15)00430-9/pdf.
71. Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded.
72. Keith Bradsher, The Antibiotic; Bayer Insists Cipro Supply is Sufficient; Fights




Congressional approval to obtain a generic version of the medicine.
"The price is the question, not the supply," Thompson told a
Congressional committee in October 2001." After Thompson's
testimony, the chair of that committee publicly stated that any request
to bypass the Bayer patent would likely be approved by Congress. 74
That proved unnecessary. Bayer got the message and responded by
cutting its Cipro price in half and pledging to provide 100 million
tablets.75
This was not the first or last time the U.S. government responded
to a health crisis with threats of compulsory licensing to a different
manufacturer. In 1994, the U.S. responded to concerns over the price
of the HIV/AIDS drug AZT by requiring companies to sign terms
committing to "reasonable pricing."7 6 In the late 1950s and early
1960s, the U.S. military repeatedly ignored Pfizer's U.S. patent for
the antibiotic tetracycline. Instead, the military simply ordered a
generic version for less than half the price from a manufacturer in
Italy, where medicine patents were not enforced.
In 2004, the U.S. government threatened Abbott Laboratories
with an override of its patent for the HIV/AIDS drug ritonavir. Like
Bayer did with the Cipro threat, Abbott got the message and dropped
its price 80% for patients in federally-funded programs. 78 Anti-trust
litigation and/or threats of a government patent override has led to
compulsory licenses being issued for stem cells, laser eye surgery,
gene therapy, ultrasound imaging catheters, and the irritable bowel
73. Associated Press, Government Threatens to Suspend Patent on Cipro, USA TODAY
(Oct. 23, 2001), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/attack/2001/10/23/anthrax-cipro.htm.
74. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: Cipro; U.S. Says




76. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORTS OF THE NIH PANELS ON COOPERATIVE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PERSPECTIVES, OUTLOOK, AND POLICY
DEVELOPMENT: JULY 21, 1994 AND SEPTEMBER 8, 1994 (1994); In fact, until 1995, a
reasonable pricing clause was a boilerplate provision in all of its cooperative research and
development agreements (Rabitschek & Latker, supra note 59, at 166-167).
77. ELLEN F.M. 'T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY
POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA
DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 43 (2009), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs
/documents/s20963en/s20963en.pdf.
78. James Love, KEIResearch Note. Recent United States Compulsory Licenses,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L 6 (Mar. 7, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Annex
A_USCompulsoryLicenses_7Mar2014_8_5x11.pdf [hereinafter Recent U.S. Compulsory
Licenses].
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syndrome drug dicyclomine.7 9 In a single five-year period from 2006
to 2011, U.S. courts issued six different compulsory licenses for
medical technologies.8 0
The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,
PEPFAR, is reported to be the world's leading consumer of generic
medicines manufactured under compulsory licenses."i In 2010, the
Affordable Care Act included a mechanism for compulsory licenses
to ensure U.S. access to patented biologic drugs.82 The U.S.
government has even exercised rights analogous to the Bayh-Dole
march-in rights in multiple non-health-related contexts, when a
determination was made that the public interest called for it. The U.S.
has issued multiple compulsory licenses for patents to military
technologies like satellites, camouflage screens, and protective
eyewear. 83
The U.S. has also issued compulsory licenses for advances in
energy technology and methods to reduce air pollution.8 4 Often,
compulsory licenses have been the remedy of choice in resolving U.S.
anti-trust lawsuits, including the blunting of patents for the
manufacture of truck parts, plastics, personal computers, corn seeds,
microprocessors, animal vaccines, and gasoline.8 5
As described in Sections V and VII, a health crisis exists,
federally-funded inventions exist to address it, but those inventions
are priced beyond any reasonable level. Clearly, the time has come
for "action . .. necessary to alleviate health and safety needs which
are not reasonably satisfied."8 6
79. James Love & Michael Palmedo, Examples of Compulsory Licensing ofIntellectual
Property in the United States- Chapter 2, CPTECH BACKGROUND PAPER I (Sept. 29, 2001),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-1498.html.
80. James Love, Open Letter to Those Who Collectively Produced the Afry 23, 2012
Statement to the WIPO SCP on the Topics of Patents and Health, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT'L (May 25, 2012) http://keionline.org/node/1420.
81. James Love, Open Letter to Patent Office, on Its War Against the Global Poor,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2012) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/open-letter-to-
patentoff b_1545232.html.
82. Recent United States Compulsory Licenses, supra note 78, at 10.
83. James Love & Michael Palmedo, Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual
Property in the United States, CPTECH BACKGROUND PAPER I (Sept. 29, 2001),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-cl.html.
8 4. Id.
85. Id and Recent US. Compulsory Licenses, supra note 78, at 1-2.
86. 35 U.S.C.A. § 203(1)(b) (West 2000).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF BAYH-DOLE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF
FEDERALLY-FUNDED INVENTIONS
As stated in Section II, the Bayh-Dole Act enabled universities
to acquire patents on the fruits of federally funded research, a change
in approach aimed at spurring innovation and increasing access to
those inventions.8 7 In the field of biomedicine, it is worthwhile to
consider the Act's impact on innovation, access, and the research
institutions involved.
A. Has Bayh-Dole Spurred Innovation in Medicimes?
Since the Act's passage, there have been many published
positive reviews issued by observers, enthusiastically asserting that
the legislation has achieved its purpose. Many of those
pronouncements quote the particularly fervent praise by The
Economist in 2002 that Bayh-Dole is "[p]ossibly the most inspired
piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-
century." 88
At first glance, that claim seems to be supported by the sheer
number of patents awarded to universities in the wake of the Act's
passage. In the twenty years after Bayh-Dole, universities produced
ten times as many patents as they did in the similar period before the
Act, and created thousands of new companies designed to
commercialize those discoveries. 89 Human biology patents increased
300% in the first five years after the Act became law. 90 Citing such
data, along with The Economist's 2002 commendation, one
intellectual property attorney has written that "Bayh-Dole is
objectively positive" and any assertion to the contrary is "complete
and utter nonsense." 9' Others have hailed the Act's "unquestioned
success." 92
87. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West 2000).
88. Innovation's Golden Goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 3.
89. Aaron S. Kesselheim, An Emptical Review of Major Legislation Affecting Drug
Development: Past Expenences, Effects, and Unintended Consequences, 89 MILBANK Q. 450
(Sept. 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3214718/.
90. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Who Owns The Knowledge Economy: Political
Organising Behind TRIPS, CORNER HOUSE BRIEFING 32 (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.
thecomerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecomerhouse.org.uk/files/32trips.pdf
91. Gene Quinn, Intellectual Dishonesty About Bayh-Dole Consequences, IP
WATCHDOG (May 10, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/10/intellectual-dishonesty
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Yet, there are significant questions about whether Bayh-Dole has
been successful in achieving its stated aims. For example, a team of
global health and intellectual property scholars wrote in 2008 that the
claims surrounding the economic impact of the Act are "overstated
and misleading." 93 They and others have argued that the sharp
increase in post-legislation academic research patent activity reflects
in part increased federal funding of that research, and that some of the
patented post-Bayh-Dole discoveries could have been commercialized
without the exclusive licenses of patents. 94
Most importantly, these scholars and others note that a spike in
the number of patents does not necessarily signal either true
innovation or benefits received by patients and taxpayers, especially
given the well-established legacy in the biomedical field of
superfluous "patent thickets" and the patenting of non-innovative "me
too" drugs. 95 In fact, one analysis of pharmacological advances in the
decades before and after Bayh-Dole showed less clinically-improved
new drugs being offered after the Act's passage than in the years
leading up to the legislation. 96
B. Has Bayh-Dole Improved Access to Federally-Funded
Inventions?
As is more fully discussed in Section III above, the debates
surrounding the consideration of the Bayh-Dole legislation featured
significant concerns that private licensing of federally-funded
inventions may have a negative impact on those inventions being
-about-bayh-dole-consequences/id=40200/.
92. Rabitschek & Latker, supra note 59, at 150.
93. Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from
the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2082 (Oct. 2008), http://joumals.plos.org
/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/joumal.pbio.0060262.
94. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER BAYH-DOLE (2004); see also Michele
Boldrin et al., Competition and Innovation, I Cato Papers on Public Pol'y 109 (2011)
(demonstrating that the increase in patents does not necessarily mean more innovation); Gerald
Barnett, University [P Bustle and Evidence for Bayh-Dole s Performance, RES. ENTERPRISE
(Feb. 3, 2017), http://researchenterprise.org/2017/02/03/university-ip-bustle-and-evidence-for-
bayh-doles-performance/ (arguing that actual university commercialization rates are low and
describing the inefficiencies created in the patent system under the Bayh-Dole Act).
95. Els Torreele, Only a Radical Overhaul Can Reclaim Medicines for the Public
Interest PLOS: BLOGS (Oct. 13, 2015), http://blogs.plos.org/yoursay/2015/10/13/talking-
about-drug-prices-access-to-medicines/.
96. DONALD W. LIGHT & ANTONIO F. MATURO, GOOD PHARMA: THE PUBLIC-HEALTH
MODEL OF THE MARIO NEGRI INSTITUTE 197 (2015).
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available to the taxpayers who supported their creation. 97 Economist
Walter Valdivia has explained how, for Bayh-Dole to be considered
successful, it must result in the fruits of federally-funded medicines
research being affordable:
That a public patent is developed into a product
doesn't directly imply maximum social benefit. If a
new product is priced so high that only very few
people can afford it, the social return will be minimal.
Consider the effect of innovation in the pricing of
drugs ... [A] good indicator of the social return on
public investment in biomedical research is therefore
affordability. 98
Affordability is an enormous concern with patented medicines
generally, with monopoly-protected medicines routinely being priced
at levels hundreds of times higher than generic alternatives. 99 Patent
monopolies shield drug-makers from market forces, as demonstrated
by pharmaceutical corporations raising their product prices by 12%
annually in recent years, far above the rate of inflation.00 Despite an
outsized national role in funding medicine innovation, U.S. patients
pay the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs.' 0 More
than one in four Americans report cost being a cause for not filling a
prescription written by their physician. 0 2
97. 1979 S. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 157 (statement of
Admiral Hyman Rickover) ("[i]n my opinion, Government contractors-including small
businesses and universities-should not be given title to inventions developed at Government
expense . . .. These inventions are paid for by the public and therefore should be available for
any citizen to use or not as he sees fit.").
98. Walter Valdivia, Tech TmansferPolicy: Bayh-Dole has DistribudonalConsequences,
I INNOVATION(Apr.-May 2013).
99. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 13, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/u
cml29385.htm.
100. Medicines Use and Spending in the U.S.-A Review of2015 and Outlook to 2020,
QUINTILESIMS (Apr. 2016), http://www.imshealth.com/en/thought-leadership/quintilesims-
institute/reports/medicines-use-and-spending-in-the-us-a-review-of-2015-and-outlook-to-2020.
101. German Lopez, After Public Outcry, Pharmaceutical Company to Cut Price ofDrug
It Hiked by 5,500 Percent, VOx (Sept. 22, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015
/9/22/9375295/turing-daraprim-price-cut.
102. Gabrial Levitt, 50 Milhon Americans, Ages 19-64, Forgo Meds in 2012 Due to
Cost; 37% of Seniors Concerned About Drug Prices, PHARMACYCHECKER BLOG (May 10,
2013), https://www.pharmacycheckerblog.com/50-million-americans-ages-19-64-forgo-meds-
in-2012-due-to-cost; Bianca DiJulio et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015, KAISER
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Remarkably, this pricing pattern holds true even for medicines
discovered with federal funding. A 2011 study of medicines for
diseases that include cancer, heart disease, and diabetes showed that
medicines whose discovery was federally-funded were priced higher
in the U.S. than in other, comparably high-income, countries-
certainly not an outcome in line with the stated Bayh-Dole legislative
intent of improving access to those discoveries.' 0 3
Often, as is the case with the drug Xtandi discussed in Section V,
those high medicine prices are being paid in significant part by the
U.S. government. Government programs like Medicare ($162 billion
in 2015)'' and Medicaid ($57.3 billion in 2015)105 incur enormous
drug purchasing costs, even while the National Institutes of Health
($32 billion per year)1 06 and other federal agencies are the
unquestioned premier funders of early-stage medicine research.
Perhaps the most high-profile example of this phenomenon is the
case of Hepatitis C medicines based on sofosbuvir, developed at an
academic institution with federal funding. 0 7 The medicine's patent is
now held by Gilead Sciences, and its resulting price tag of as much as
$84,000 for a single patient is causing enormous financial pressure for
federal and state health agencies forced to pay the monopoly mark-up
for a drug that can be manufactured for as little as $68, and is sold in
other countries for as little as $300.108 As one analyst has said, when
it comes to medicines, governments plays the role of "incompetent
venture capitalists," paying at both the front and back ends of the
process. 109
FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2015), http://kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
tracking-poll-august-2015/.
103. Tedmund Wan, 2011: Survey of Drug Prices for 14 Drugs with US Government
Rights in Patents Listed in the FDA Orange Book, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Nov. 11,
2011), http://www.keionline.org/node/1 541.
104. Update to Medicare Drug Spending Dashboar CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SRVS. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase
/Fact-sheets/2016-Fact-sheets-items/2016-11-14.htmi.
105. Id.
106. Budget NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.nih.gov/about-
nih/what-we-do/budget.
107. Veronika J. Wirtz et al., Essential Medicines for Universal Health Coverage, 389
LANCET 403, 408 (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-
6736(16)31599-9.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Fran Quigley, Patients Before Profits, COMMONWEAL (June 28, 2016),
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/patients-profits.
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For the most valuable medicines, the U.S. government plays an
even more crucial role. With pharmaceutical corporations' research
inevitably focused on the search for profitable products, that research
often prioritizes non-critical health needs such as cosmetic or sexual
performance drugs or "me too" drugs, the non-innovative medicines
aimed at carving out a piece of an existing lucrative market.110 That
leads the NIH and other government funders to take the leadership
role in discovering the most impactful medicines. A study of drugs
receiving the priority review status from the US Food and Drug
Administration, meaning that the medicines would provide a
significant improvement in treatment, showed that two-thirds of them
traced their roots back to government-funded research. "'
Ironically, even fervent supporters of Bayh-Dole cannot avoid
underscoring the medicines' accessibility problem, even when making
the case for the Act's positive impact. The same intellectual property
attorney who wrote that Bayh-Dole's record is "objectively positive"
(and accused those who expressed concerns about the Act of
intellectual dishonesty) referenced in the same article medicines like
the leukemia drug Gleevec and the breast cancer drug Herceptin.l 12 A
testimonial highlighted in the article acknowledged that the basic
research that led to medicines like these was funded by the federal
government because that research "is generally too risky and too
expensive for private industry to undertake alone." 1 3
Yet, the very drugs referenced are some of those most widely
condemned as examples of breathtaking cost inflation far beyond
either private manufacturing cost or private research investments,
leading to enormous corporate profit margins and corresponding
patient accessibility problems. 1 14 The corporation Novartis makes
$4.7 billion per year from government-discovered Gleevec, which is
110. Torreele, supra note 95.
111. Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are The Respective Roles Of
The Public And Private Sector In Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332 (Feb.
2011), http://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0917.
112. Quinn, supra note 91.
113. Id
114. Carolyn Y. Johnson, This Drug is Defying a Rare Form ofLeukemia-and It Keeps
Getting nicier, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/this-
drug-is-defying-a-rare-forn-of-leukemia-and-it-keeps-getting-pricier/2016/03/09/4fff8102-
c571-11 e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html; Treatment Action Campaign, People Living with




priced as high as $120,000 per year for a single patient." 5 One
analysis estimated that it only takes Novartis thirteen days of Gleevec
sales revenue to cover the corporation's research and development
investment.11 6 Herceptin's manufacturer, Roche, made $11.6 billion
in profits in 2015 from the medicine discovered in significant part due
to federal funding, and charges as much as $70,000 for a year's
dose. 11 7 These are two of many medicines in this category.
Another widely quoted Bayh-Dole supporter is former Yale
president Richard Levin, who in 2001 memorably praised the Act as a
"benefit to humanity."', 1 8 That very same year, Yale was the target of
intense global criticism for its allegedly inhumane handling of
federally-funded medicine research on its campus.11 9 It turns out that
stavudine, a key drug to address HIV/AIDS, had been discovered at
Yale with federal funding, and then licensed to a pharmaceutical
corporation that was paying Yale $40 million per year in fees.1 20
Those fees were enabled by the corporation pricing the drug hundreds
of times higher than its manufacturing cost. 12 1
That price was far beyond the means of millions of people dying
untreated of HIV/AIDS each year, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa.1 22 Among the critics of the price barrier and resulting
inaccessibility was the Yale professor who invented the drug. 123
Activist pressure eventually forced Yale and its co-licensee to lower
its price, but the millions of HIV/AIDS patients who died untreated
115. Johnson, supranote 114.
116. James Love, R&D Costs for Gleevec, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 3, 2013,
8:07AM) http://keionline.org/node/1697.
117. John Miller, Roche Annual Profit Disappoints, Outlook Muted REUTERS
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-roche-results-idUSKCNOV60SS; Christian
Nordqvist, One Year on Herceptin for Breast Cancer Ideal, MED. NEWS TODAY (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/250912.php.
118. Academic IP: Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Commercialization
and Research, NAT'L ACADS. BOARD ON SC., TECH., & ECON. POL'Y 261 (Apr. 17, 2001),
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/NACADUS/NOI 0417W.pdf.
119. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Afica, N.Y. TIMES




122. Id; Additional Notes on Government Role in the Development of HIVADS
Drugs, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (Feb. 23, 2000), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids
/gov-role.html (showing government support for Yale research on the prescription).
123. McNeil Jr., supra note 119.
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before the price was lowered never saw the fruits of the claimed
Bayh-Dole "benefit to humanity." 124
Overall, the picture of Bayh-Dole's impact on essential
medicines reveals an arrangement that is problematic for taxpayers
and patients, but exceedingly favorable for pharmaceutical
corporations. As economist Marianna Mazzucato says, the U.S.
"invests in the most uncertain stage of the business cycle and lets
businesses hop on for the easier ride down the way." 2 5 When the end
of that ride features a government-granted monopoly market on a life-
or-death product, it is not surprising that the industry's profit margins
are unsurpassed. 126
Nor is it surprising that Bayh-Dole's enabling of government-
funded research to set the stage for private profit has negatively
impacted medicine research in the private sector, which now spends
more on marketing drugs than discovering them.1 2 7 Why spend
corporate resources on research that taxpayers will conduct without
cost to the corporation? The consulting firm Bain recently
conducted a study that showed that top pharmaceutical corporations
were earning more than 70 percent of their revenue from medicines
that were developed elsewhere. 12 8
This post-Bayh-Dole state of affairs in biomedicine has turned
some supporters into critics. That includes the publication that was
once the legislation's global cheerleader. The Economists oft-quoted
2002 affection for the Act has significantly soured, as it published
multiple articles in 2015 noting that the limited amount of impactful
private pharmaceutical research has been coupled with access
124. History, U. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MED., http://uaem.org/who-we-are/history/
(last viewed Feb. 11, 2017).
125. MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS I (rev. ed. 2015).
126. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223; Liyan Chen, Best of the
Biggest: How Profitable Are the World's Largest Companies?, FORBES (May 13, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/05/13/best-of-the-biggest-how-profitable-are-the-
worlds-largest-companies/#4beldc6f4c33.
127. Is There a Cure for High Drug Prices?, CONSUMER REP. (July 29, 2016),
http://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/cure-for-high-drug-prices/; GlobalData, Top 30
Pharma Companies Spent $112 Billion on Research and Development in 2013, DRUG DEV. &
DELIVERY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.drug-dev.com/Main/Back-Issues/Top-30-Pharma-
Companies-Spent-i112-Billion-on-Resea-818.aspx; Anderson, supra note 126.
128. Nils Behnke et al., New Paths to Value Creation in Pharma, BAIN & CO. (Sept. 24
2014), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/new-paths-to-value-creation-in-pharma.aspx.
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problems. 129 One of the articles concluded, "Ensuring that the benefits
of greater research efficiency are fully passed on to governments and
health insurers would require drastic changes, such as, say, abolishing
the patent system and finding some other way to incentivize basic
research." 1 30
C Has Bayh-Dole Had a Positive Impact on Academic
Institutions and Research Priorities?
The Bayh-Dole Act's positive impact on the pharmaceutical
industry's bottom line is no surprise, especially in light of the
industry's determined lobbying in support of the legislation.13 1 At the
time, it seemed that there would be an even bigger winner under
Bayh-Dole: the academic research institutions that would now be
allowed to claim exclusive licenses for their federally-funded
inventions.' 32 Yet there has been widespread criticism of Bayh-Dole's
impact on the academy.
Historically, research at academic institutions was characterized
by public dissemination of knowledge, an approach that is now
characterized by the widely celebrated open source software
movement.1 33 But Bayh-Dole shifted the university research focus
toward the erection of patent walls around discovered knowledge and
partnerships with for-profit corporations, including corporations
created directly by university faculty to monetize their inventions.1 34
Many see this trend as a disturbing one and contrary to the time-
honored educational mission of such institutions: "Instead of
embodying open-knowledge commons, higher education risks
becoming a propertied space where institutions predominantly view
129. Billion Dollar Babies, ECONOMIST (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.economist.com
/news/business/21679203-high-cost-rd-used-explain-why-drugs-giants-merge-and-why-they-
must-charge [hereinafter Billion Dollar Babies]. A Question ofUtility, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8,
2015), http://www.economist.com/node/21660559.
130. Billion Dollar Babies, supra note 129.
131. Drug Industry Influence Timeline, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www
.publicintegrity.org/2005/07/07/5791/drug-industry-influence-timeline (last updated May 19,
2014).
132. The Bayh-Dole Act Research & History Central - Founding Fathers - Howard
Bremer, IP MALL, https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/bayh-dole-act-research-history-central-
founding-fathers-howard-bremer (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
133. Mowery et al., supra note 94; Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics:
Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14819), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4819. -
134. So et al., supra note 93.
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their identities through a commercial lens," writes Jacob H. Rooksby
in The Branding of the American Md.1 35
There are data to support this concern, with academic researchers
reporting significant pressure from university partner private
corporations to hide information, suppress negative research results,
and transfer patent ownership rights to companies in return for
research-related gifts or support.136 The overall impact of the shift in
university research priorities contributes to what Michael Heller and
Rebecca Eisenberg have called the "anticommons," where profit-
motivated patent thickets block the shared knowledge that helps spur
scientific advancement.1 37  Perhaps even more concerning,
universities' focus on the possibility of a patented pot of gold at the
end of the research rainbow is demonstrably inattentive to aptly-
named "neglected diseases," which torment and even kill billions
globally, but whose victims do not represent a lucrative market for a
potential patented drug. 138
Ironically, at the same time that Bayh-Dole's impact on
university research culture has proven to be quite significant, the
Act's impact on those .institutions' bottom line is usually minimal.
With the exception of a few blockbuster discoveries-such as
UCLA's role in the Xtandi discovery as outlined in Section V-most
universities collect very little net income from patents.1 39
135. See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How
UNIVERSITIES CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT
MATTERS (2006).
136. See, e.g., Adriane Fugh-Berman, How Basic Scientists Help the Pharmaceutical
Industry Market Drugs, 4 PLOS BIOLOGY 11 (2013); JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY
INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 352 (2005); DANIEL S.
GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS, AND DELUSIONS OF CAMPUS
CAPITALISM 288 (2007); David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic
Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences: An Industry Survey. 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 368
(1996); Eric G. Campbell et al., Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Corporate Gifts
Supporting Life Sciences Research 279 JAMA 995 (1998).
137. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
138. The Global Network for Neglected Tropical Diseases, SABIN VACCINE INST.,
http://www.sabin.org/programs/global-network-neglected-tropical-diseases-0 (last visited Feb.
13, 2017); Belen Pedrique et al., The Drug and Vaccine Landscape for Neglected Diseases
(2000-11): A Systematic Assessment 1 LANCET e371 (2013).
139. Richard Prez-Peila, Patenting Their Discoveries Does Not Pay Off for Most
Universities, a Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11
/21/education/patenting-their-discoveries-does-not-pay-off-for-most-universities-a-study-
says.html; Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471 (2013),
http://www.nature.com/news/universities-struggle-to-make-patents-pay-1.1 3811.
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D. Petitions Filed for Federal Licensing Under the Bayb-Dole
Act
Despite the government retention of some licensing rights under
Bayh-Dole, as described in Section II, and despite the ongoing
availability crisis for federally-funded medicines described above, the
U.S. government has never exercised its Bayh-Dole march-in
rights. 14 0 Before the Xtandi petition described in detail in Section VII,
the U.S. National Institutes of Health had received and ruled on four
march-in petitions.
In 1997, Cell-Pro, Inc. filed a march-in request on four patents
for a cancer-fighting antibody. 141 In 2004, Essential Inventions filed
march-in requests for patents on an HIV/AIDS drug, ritonavir, after
patent-holder Abbott Laboratories increased the drug's U.S. price by
400% in one day.1 4 2 That same year, Essential Inventions also
requested march-in on the glaucoma drug latanoprost. Latanoprost
was invented at Columbia University with federal funding and
licensed to Pfizer, which sold the drug in the U.S. at a cost two to five
times the price charged in other countries. 143
140. Bayh-Dole does not establish any threshold for the government's contribution to
the research that led to the final medicine before its retained rights become effective. Although
corporate patent-holders do contribute to the later-stage development of medicines discovered
with federal funding, it is clear there is no monetary threshold in the Act. As for whether
retained rights apply only to discoveries where all applicable patents on the medicine trace
back to government funding, that question is outside the scope of this article, especially since
Xtandi's patents are all derived from federal funding. But the authors are persuaded that the
Act does not require that 100% of the patents must come from a federally-funded source. Cf
Aaron Kesselheim et al., The High Cost offPrescription Drugs in the United States Origins and
Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858 (2016) (taking the position that march-in rights can be
used on "products that were developed in large part with government funding."). Compare
University Research and the Patent System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. supra note 57 (testimony of Robert Weissman), and Mundy, supra note 60
(quoting James Love saying, "It doesn't matter if the government grant was for millions of
dollars or for a few thousand."), with Engelberg & Kesselheim, infra note 246. See generally
Arno & Davis, supra note 41.
141. In the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., (Nat'l Inst. of Health Aug. 1, 1997)
(determination), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/cellpro-marchin
.pdf.
142. In the Case of NORVIR@ Manufactured by Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (Nat'l Inst.
of Health July 29, 2004) (determination), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/policy/March-In-Norvir.pdf.
143. In the Case of Xalatan@ Manufactured by Pfizer, Inc. (Nat'l Inst. of Health Sept.
17, 2004) (determination), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-
in-xalatan.pdf; Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Makers Reap Profits on Tax-Backed
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al.
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In 2010, three U.S. citizens with Fabry's disease filed a march-in
request for the medicine fabrazyme, developed at the Mt. Sinai
School of Medicine with NIH funding, and subsequently licensed to
the corporation Genzyme. At the time the U.S. Fabry's patients filed
their petition, they were being rationed at only 30 percent of the
recommended dose. Newly-diagnosed patients were being denied the
drug altogether. The petition to the NIH asked for the agency to
exercise its Bayh-Dole march-in rights by licensing another
manufacturer to make the drug and give a five percent royalty to the
patent-holder.m
Each of the four petitions was denied, with the NIH specifically
stating in the ritonavir and latanoprost cases that "the extraordinary
remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means for controlling
prices."1 45 The fabrazyme petition seemed to side-step that issue,
since the concern was availability, not price: the drug developed by
US funds was fully available to European patients even while U.S.
patients were being turned away. 14 6 But the NIH refused to act,
suggesting that a different manufacturer would not get up to speed
quickly enough to address the problem. 14 7 The attorney who
represented the petitioners, one of whom has since died from
complications of the disease, says the fabrazyme ruling indicates the
NIH has no intention of ever using Bayh-Dole to license generic drug
manufacturing. "At this point, we know that those rights are legally
worthless," he said. 148
E. The Pharmaceutical Industry's Relationship with Federal
Health Agencies
The attorney representing the Fabry's disease patients is not the
only person frustrated with the legacy of Bayh-Dole. To some, the
NIH refusal to exercise march-in rights in even a single instance in
the thirty-six-year history of the Act, especially in the face of ongoing
144. Letter from John Brockman, President, Am. Med. Student Ass'n, et al. to Kathleen
Sebelius, Secretary, Dept. of Health & Human Services (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/amsa-kei-pc-pirg-uaemFabrazymeletter_27aug201 0.
pdf [hereinafter Fabrazyme Request Letter].
145. See supra notes 142-143.
146. Fabrazyme Request Letter, supra note 144.
147. See supra notes 142-144.
148. Fran Quigley, The $100,000-Per-Year Pill How US Health Agencies Choose
Pharma Over Patients, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/371 11-
the-i 00-000-per-year-pill-how-us-health-agencies-choose-pharma-over-patients.
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medicine access crises, suggests the process is influenced by more
than purely abstract statutory interpretation.
U.S. Representative Lloyd Doggett is one of many who points to
the pharmaceutical industry's significant ties to the administrative
agencies charged with administering the government-private industry
dynamics initiated by Bayh-Dole.1 4 9  "To maintain its cozy
relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, NIH has chosen to
ignore price-gouging," Congressman Doggett said in
2016. "Taxpayers continue to fund research for too many drugs that
too many cannot afford."" 0
Doggett's reference to the relationship between NIH and the
pharmaceutical industry invokes the industry's well-established role
in Washington D.C. The industry is a prolific spender on both
lobbying expenses and campaign contributions, and has more than
1,000 lobbyists working in Washington, D.C. alone.' In addition,
the key staff in the industry and at federal health departments share
enough common backgrounds that observers complain about a
"revolving door" between the corporations and the agencies tasked
with regulating them.1 5 2 The Foundation of the NIH is managed by
a board of directors stocked with pharmaceutical industry executives
and lobbyists.1 5 3
In April of 2016, when NIH director Francis Collins was asked
by Senator Richard Durbin at a Senate hearing why he was reluctant
to exercise Bayh-Dole licensing rights, Collins replied that he feared
doing so would harm the agency's relationship with the drug
companies.1 54 Other NIH and Department of Defense staff has made
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Top Industies, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby
/top.php?indexType=i (last visited Feb.11, 2017).
152. Sheila Kaplan, From FDA Expert to Biotech Insider The Drug Industry Thrives on
the Revolving Door, STAT (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/27/fda-
biopharama-revolving-door-study/; Revolving Door Between the US Government and
Industry, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (Feb. 2006), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/politics
/revolvingdoor.html.
153. Board ofDirectors, FOUND. FOR NAT'L INST. HEALTH, http://www.fnih.org/about
/directors (last viewed Feb. 11, 2017).
154. See Jeannie Baumann, NIH Pulls Back on Using Bayh-Dole for Drug Picing,




it clear that they view march-in petitions as threats to the financial
well-being of the pharmaceutical industry. 55
The NIH also awards private companies exclusive licenses to
some drugs it discovers in-house, and its process for doing so has
been criticized as non-transparent and overly solicitous of corporate
priorities. 15 6 In one public statement that may have been more
revealing than intended, a spokesperson for a company that received
one of the licenses called his CEO's relationship with an NIH official
an "asset." 5 7
One intellectual property scholar and attorney, Alfred Engelberg,
has said that the current Bayh-Dole-created medicine research
dynamic equates to an "unholy alliance" between the NIH, academic
centers, and the pharmaceutical industry.5 8 The end result, he says, is
socialized drug discovery leading to privatized profits. 5 9 "The
question here is, 'How stupid is the'government?"' Engelberg says.
"Billions of dollars in biomedical research is handed over to the
industry with no strings attached, and then the government buys the
majority of the output at the other end, with no price regulation." 6 0
V. XTANDI AND THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
Xtandi is the brand name of the prescription drug enzalutimade.
It is a synthetic, nonsteroidal pure antiandrogen that is used to treat an
advanced and aggressive form of prostate cancer, metastatic
castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC).161 Castration resistant
prostate cancer (CRPC) develops in ten to twenty percent of men with
155. Mundy, supra note 60.
156. See generally NIH Licenses (Patents, Data) and Comments on Proposed Exclusive
Licenses, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, http://keionline.org/nih-licenses (last viewed Feb. 11,
2017).
157. Zachary Brennan, NIH's Exclusive Licenses to Biotech, Pharma Start-Ups: Lots of
Secrecy, Few Successes, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC'Y (May 10, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Reg
ulatory-Focus/News/2016/05/10/24906/NIH%E2%80%99s-Exclusive-Licenses-to-Biotech-
Pharma-Start-Ups-Lots-of-Secrecy-Few-Successes/.
158. Quigley, supra note 148.
159. Alfred Engelberg, How Government Policy Promotes High Drug Pices, HEALTH
AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/29ihow-
government-policy-promotes-high-drug-prices/.
160. Quigley, supra note 148.
161. Letter from Knowledge Ecology Int'l and Union for Affordable Cancer Treatment
to Sylvia Burwell, Sec'y, Dept. of Health & Human Affairs, Francis Collins, Dir., Nat'l Inst.
of Health, and Ashton Carter, Sec'y, Dept. of Defense 16 (Jan. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Xtandi
Petition].
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prostate cancer within five years when the cancer progresses and the
cells become castrate resistant and no longer receptive to traditional
therapies. 162 Xtandi is a new treatment option developed to combat
this problem, meant to improve the quality of life and the life
expectancy of patients diagnosed with mCRPC, which ranges from
nine to thirteen months.163
Xtandi is manufactured in 40mg oral tablets, with the typical
dosage being four tablets per day.' 64 While five other CRPC treatment
drugs exist, Xtandi is less invasive than the four other non-tablet form
treatments and better tolerated than the only other oral tablet form
treatment due to a lower toxicological profile.165
A. The Discovery and Development ofXtandi
Research and development of enzalutimade began in the early
2000s at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) with a
team led by a chemist, Dr. Michael Jung, and an oncologist, Dr.
Charles Sawyer.1 66 Xtandi has three patents listed in the FDA Orange
Book, the book of approved drugs: 7709517 (diarylydantoin
compounds), 8183274 (treatment of hyperproliferative disorders with
diarylhydantoin), and 9126941 (treatment of hyperproliferative
disorders with diarylhydantoin compounds). 167 The U.S. provisional
application for the invention was filed May 13, 2005, and the first
patent application was filed a year later on May 15, 2006. The
assignee for all three patents was The Regents of the University of
California.1 6 8 Clinical trials for Xtandi commenced in July 2007.169 A
total of four clinical trials were conducted, with the final one
concluding in July 2012.170 After a priority review new drug
162. M. Kirby et al., Characterising the Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer Population:
A Systematic Review, 65 INT'LJ.CLNICALPRAC. 1180, 1183 (2011).
163. Suman Bhattacharya et al., Development of Enzalutamide for Metastatic
Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer, 1358 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCL 13 (2015).
164. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 4.
165. Id. at II (referring to the other treatment forms that are administered by IV,
leukapheresis, or radiopharmaceuticals, whereas Xtandi and Zytiga are administered in pill
form but Zytiga must be taken with prednisone, unlike Xtandi).
166. Xtandi - From Bench to Bedside, UCLA TECH. DEv. GRP., http://tdg.uclaoip.com/
xtandi%C2%AE-%E2%80%93-bench-bedside (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
167. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 15.
168. See U.S. Patent No. 7,709,517 (filed May 15, 2006); U.S. Patent No. 8,183,274
(filed February 18, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 9,126,941 (filed Apr. 17, 2012).
169. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 18.
170. Id.
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application was filed May 22, 2012, to fast track the drug, Xtandi
gained FDA approval August 31, 2012.171 Since obtaining initial FDA
approval, multiple new clinical trials have commenced attempting to
expand the use of enzalutamide for treatment of other cancers.1 7 2
1. NIH and DoD Funding of Xtandi Research
Original funding for research and development of Xtandi came
from the United States federal government in the form of a National
Institutes of Health (NIH) SPORE grant and a grant from the
Department of Defense.7 7 As identified under the "government
interests" section of each of the three patents for Xtandi at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. government "has certain rights
in the invention" because of the federal funding that helped lead to the
invention. 174
Federal funding was also involved at the clinical trial stage. Both
Phase 1 and Phase 2 of clinical trials received funding from the
National Cancer Institute and the Department of Defense.1 5
Additional funding was provided by several charitable
organizations. 17 6  The final two phases of trials were funded
commercially through Medivation, Inc. and Astellas Pharma.177
171. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., No. 2034150rig1s000, SUMMARY REVIEW
APPLICATION (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs/nda/2012/20
3415OriglsO0OSumR.pdf (stating May 22, 2012 as the date of submission); see also U.S FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., Drug Approval Package (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2012/203415_xtanditoc.cfm.
172. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 12 (referring to "breast cancer . .. hepatocellular
carcinoma, bladder cancer, ovarian or fallopian tube cancer, pancreatic cancer, and Mantle
Cell Lymphoma").
173. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 11 (listing NIH grant number 5 P50 CA092131
and DOD grant number W81XWH-04-1-0129).
174. See U.S. Patents supra note 168.
175. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 18.
176. Id. at 11 ("For example, a 2009 paper in Science reporting on the development of
MDV3 100 (the development name for enzalutamide) acknowledged funding from the Prostate
Cancer Foundation, the National Cancer Institute, the DOD PCO51382 Prostate Cancer
Research Program Clinical Consortium Award, and support from the Charles H. Revson
Foundation. Likewise, a 2010 paper in the Lancet reporting on a critical Phase 1-2 trial
acknowledges the financial support of Medivation, but also the Prostate Cancer Foundation,
National Cancer Institute, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Doris Duke Charitable
Foundation, and Department of Defense Prostate Cancer Clinical Trial Consortium.").
177. Id. at 18.
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2. University-Held Patents and Transfer of Licenses
As discussed above, Xtandi patents were originally assigned to
the Regents of the University of California because the discovery of
the drug occurred at UCLA. On August 12, 2005, however, The
Regents of the University of California entered into a licensing
agreement with the biopharmaceutical company Medivation, Inc. and
Medivation Prostate Therapeutics, Inc. (MPT), a subsidiary of
Medivation, that gave MPT an exclusive worldwide license of the
patents covering Xtandi.17 8  The licensing agreement obligated
Medivation to pay an annual fee to The Regents of the University of
California, as well as payments upon reaching milestone events, not
to exceed $2.8 million total, 17 9 and royalty payments starting the year
Xtandi became commercially sold.' 80
On October 26, 2009, when the drug was still in Phase 3 of
clinical trials, Medivation entered into a collaboration agreement'8 1
with Japanese pharmaceutical company Astellas Pharma Inc. that
sublicensed Xtandi patent rights to Astellas. The goal of the
agreement was to further commercialize and develop the drug. 18 2 The
UCLA licensing agreement was subsequently amended to include an
additional payment requirement of ten percent of all income to
Medivation under the Astellas collaboration agreement and four
percent royalties on global net sales.183 Royalty payments to UCLA
were to be split 50/50 between Medivation and Astellas, under the
terms of the collaboration agreement, for Xtandi sales within the
United States and Astellas assumed responsibility for royalty
payments to UCLA for sales outside of the United States. 184 The
collaboration agreement also designated Astellas as the party
responsible for all global manufacturing of Xtandi, giving Astellas the
sole rights to distribution and sales of the drug.' 85 Medivation retained
the right to market the drug jointly with Astellas within the United
178. Medivation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 21, 2013).
179. Paid in full as of Dec. 31, 2012. Id.
180. Exclusive License Agreement Between The Regents of The University of
California and Medivation, Inc. and Medivation Prostate Therapeutics, Inc. (Aug. 12, 2005)
181. Collaboration Agreement (Oct. 26, 2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/101 1835/000119312510057020/dexlO15.htm.
18 2. Id.
183. Medivation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2016) [hereinafter
Medivation 2016 Form 10-K].




States. 8 6  Additionally, under the collaboration agreement,
Medivation and Astellas agreed to equally split all profits for U.S.
sales.' 8 7 For sales outside of the U.S., Astellas agreed to pay royalties
to Medivation.' 88
a. Xtandi as Example ofHow Bayh-Dole has Transformed
Discovery and Licensing
Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, an invention
that was developed at a public university with federal government
funding would likely be owned by the federal government.' 89
However, in an attempt to spur innovation, the Bayh-Dole Act
authorizes the retention of ownership of the intellectual property
rights by the inventors to financially incentivize private industry
involvement and merely grants certain rights in the invention to the
federal government, such as a royalty-free nonexclusive license or
Section 203 march-in rights. This means that universities and for-
profit entities are now able to make enormous profits from inventions
that are funded with taxpayer dollars.
Xtandi provides an instructive example. The impact of the Bayh-
Dole Act on university-developed inventions can be clearly
demonstrated through its creation. It arose from a mix of university
and industry research and development, originally conducted by
university researchers and government funding, but industry
investment and involvement increased as the drug proved its potential
success and value through clinical trials. Once UCLA discovered the
drug, two of the inventors made an arrangement with the
pharmaceutical industry, via a licensing agreement with Medivation,
to bring the drug to market.' 90 Medivation sponsored the first two
clinical trials, but in combination with more federal funding.' 9 '
With clinical trial results looking bright for Xtandi, Medivation
partnered with Astellas to manufacture and commercialize the drug
through an additional sublicensing agreement.1 92 After two more
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. at 53.
188. Id.
189. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 3, at 1378.
190. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 14.
191. Id at 18.
192. See Stuart Wolpert, Astellas, Medivation to Develop, Commercialize MDV3100




clinical trials, Astellas submitted a new drug application to the FDA
and obtained FDA approval several months later.1 93 Outside of the
funding from the federal government, Xtandi research and
development was made possible with investments from Medivation
and Astellas totaling approximately $724.5 million as of 2015.194
Xtandi sales began in the United States, following FDA approval, at
the end of 2012.195 Sales of Xtandi outside of the United States started
mid 2013.196
UCLA has benefitted greatly from the discovery of Xtandi and
its commercial success. By licensing the intellectual property rights in
Xtandi to Medivation and its sub-licensee Astellas, the university was
able to remove itself from further development of the drug while still
earning revenue from it. UCLA earned $2.8 million, plus annual
maintenance payments, plus ten percent of Medivation's income from
Astellas under the collaboration agreement, plus four percent royalty
payments from global net sales.' 97 Medivation's income from Astellas
through the collaboration agreement reached $665 million as of
December 31, 2015.198 A dispute has arisen over the exact amount of
that sublicensing income that UCLA is entitled to under the
agreement, and litigation has ensued.1 99 However, according to
Medivation, $32 million has been paid to UCLA as of the first quarter
of 2016.200
In an attempt "to provide stability and minimize risk associated
with the volatility of the pharmaceutical industry marketplace,"
UCLA decided to sell its royalty rights in Xtandi to Royalty Pharma,
a privately held New York based pharmaceutical company, on March
4, 2016.201 The university received approximately $520 million from
the transaction, which it has invested in a portfolio designed to allow
payouts of roughly $60 million per year through 2027. The goal of the
193. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 17.
194. Calculated based on Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, figures plus the Medivation
2016 Form 10-K, supra note 183 which listed Medivation direct costs as $74,616,000 and
Astellas cost share of $60.8M.
195. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 10.
196. Id.
197. Medivation 2016 Form 10-K, supra note 183, at 8.
198. Id at 60.
199. Id at 65.
200. Id.
201. See Phil Hampton, UCLA Sells Royalty Rights Connected with Cancer Drug to




fund is to provide additional research funding for the school, as well
as student scholarships.202
It is evident from the history of Xtandi how the Bayh-Dole Act
has changed the landscape of how inventions are developed and
ultimately commercialized. UCLA, Medivation, and Astellas, among
others, have benefited exponentially from federally-funded research.
The Bayh-Dole Act made it so that huge economic incentives were
necessary to induce industry involvement and bring Xtandi fully to
market.
VI. THE XTANDI AVAILABILITY CRISIS
Currently, in the United States, the cost for a one-year course of
treatment of Xtandi per patient is roughly $129,269.203 This price
point is the highest of any country in the world. As such, it is having
negative repercussions on patient access to the drug and inhibiting
availability simply because the drug is unaffordable. Its cost is a
heavy burden to the Medicare program and other federal healthcare
programs; but it is also putting a large strain on private insurance
plans, to the point that some insurers are cutting off patient access
altogether. Research data has demonstrated that its price has increased
every year since Xtandi gained FDA approval in 2012, which could
signify that these barriers to access due to price will endure unless
something is done.204
A. Costs to Medicare and other Federal Programs
On average, prostate cancer diagnoses occur at the age of 66
when the individual is already eligible for or enrolled in Medicare. 205
Because of this, Medicare is responsible for around 68.6% of overall
U.S. Xtandi sales.206 In 2015, total Medicare spending for Xtandi was
an enormous $790,655,731.47.207 The average cost per pill was
202. Id.
203. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 4 (referring to the Apr. 2015 U.S. AWP of
$88.48 x 4 pills per day x 365.25 days).
204. Id at 10 (Table 4.2).
205. Id at 9.
206. Medicare spent $790,655,731.47 on Xtandi in 2015 and overall US Xtandi sales
totaled $1,151,317,000 according to Medivation, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25,
2015).





$73.94208 This was a seven percent increase from the 2014 Medicare
price of $69.41,209 making the average cost to Medicare for a one year
course of treatment approximately $108,026.34. Medicare
beneficiaries receiving Xtandi treatment in 2015 reached 16,912, with
their cost share totaling nearly $42.5 million.210 With the United
States baby boomer population aging, the number of Medicare
beneficiaries needing Xtandi could continue to rise, placing further
monetary burden on the system. 2 1 1
Some Medicare beneficiaries are low income and eligible to
receive both Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Individuals that qualify
for both benefits are known as dual-eligibility beneficiaries and
receive low income subsidies to help them afford treatment.2 12 While
the exact amount that Medicaid pays for Xtandi is unknown at this
time, it appears that Medicaid also pays some of the high cost of the
drug, at least in the dual-eligibility category. Published Medicare data
for 2015 indicated that the cost share of Xtandi for a Medicare
beneficiary was $3,081.14, whereas the cost share of Xtandi for a
Medicare beneficiary receiving a low-income subsidy was $178.81.213
Again, the exact amount paid by Medicaid is unknown, but this
$2,902.43 difference suggests that the price of Xtandi is having a
significant impact on Medicaid spending, also.
The Department of Veterans Affairs has the potential to be
impacted by the exorbitant price of Xtandi, as well. A study
conducted in 2013 indicated that Vietnam and Korean veterans with
possible Agent Orange exposure face an increased risk of prostate
cancer.214 At this time, however, Xtandi/enzalutamide is not included
on the VA National formulary,2 15 meaning that it would have to be




211. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 9.
212. DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
PROGRAMS 3 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Net
work-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MedicareBeneficiariesDual EligiblesAt_aGlance
.pdf
213. Medicare Spending Dashboard 2015, supra note 207.
214. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 9 (citing Nathan Ansbaugh et al., Agent Orange
as a Risk Factor for Ihngh-Grade Prostate Cancer, 119 CANCER 2399 (July 1, 2013)).
215. See VA Formulary Search, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFF. http://www.pbm.va.gov
/apps/vanationalformulary/ (In Search For field, enter "Xtandi").
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specially requested and approved.216 Astellas has contracted with the
VA to provide enzalutamide through October 14, 2018, though.2 17
The price per dosage is currently listed at $42.38.218
B. Lack ofAccess to Patients in Private Insurance Plans
Patients covered under private insurance plans face even greater
access barriers to Xtandi. The April 2015 average wholesale price of
the drug was $88.48 per pill, making a full year's treatment
approximately $129,269 in the United States. 2 19 This is a price
difference of double to quadruple the prices paid by similarly situated
high-income countries, such as those in Europe or Canada and
Australia. 220
Due to the excessive pricing in the Unites States, private
insurance companies are trying to restrict access to the drug.
Restricted access is achieved by requiring prior authorization by the
insurer before treatment can begin or by utilizing a tier system that
places that drug on one of the tiers with the highest co-pays,
effectively increasing the cost burden of the beneficiary. 2 2 ' At an
extreme, some health plans may soon follow in the footsteps of CVS
Health, who will remove Xtandi from its formulary in February 2017
in an attempt to control health plan costs. 2 2 2 Restrictive access
policies are detrimental because if access is restricted due to of the
cost of the drug, it is ultimately the patient's health that suffers.
There are currently three FDA approved prostate cancer
treatment drugs that are the leading prescription choices of doctors in
the United States.2 23 Oncologists might make clinical determinations
to prescribe Xtandi over the other two when treating patients with
certain drug sensitivities. 224 Studies have shown that Xtandi should be
216. Veterans Affairs National Formulary Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF
VETERANS AFF., http://www.pbm.va.gov/pbm/nationalformulary/vanationalformularyfrequent
lyaskedquestions.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
217. Pharmaceutical Catalog Search, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.va
.gov/nac/Pharma/List (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
218. Id.
219. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 4.
220. Id. at 5 (Table 1.1).
221. Id. at 6.
222. See Robert Langreth, CVS Cuts Coverage of Dozens of Drugs in Exclusion
Expansion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-
02/cvs-plans-to-bar-novartis-cancer-drug-from-2017-covered-drugs.
223. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 5.
224. Id. at 6.
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the first form of treatment if it is to be maximally effective.2 25 If a
patient takes one of the other two prostate cancer drugs prior to
starting Xtandi, it is possible that the patient develops a resistance to
Xtandi and is unable to receive its full effectiveness. 2 2 6 In some
patients, complete resistance to Xtandi can develop.22 7 Thus, it is
problematic if a health insurance plan requires a patient to fail other
forms of prostate cancer treatment before being allowed to begin
treatment with Xtandi, which is exactly what occurs when a patient is
forced to receive prior authorization. The insurer is limiting patient
choice and access to Xtandi solely based on the price and without
regard to the negative health implications for the patient.
VII. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO XTANDI CRISIS
On January 14, 2016 two non-profit organizations, Knowledge
Ecology International (KEI) and the Union of Affordable Cancer
Treatment (UACT), petitioned the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to use their power under the Bayh-Dole Act
to make Xtandi available to the public on reasonable terms.22 8
Additionally, several attempts were made by various members of
Congress urging the agencies to offer further guidance and
clarification on the Act.229 The petition was eventually denied roughly
five months later, however.
225. Id. (citing Tian Zhang et al., Enzalutamide Versus Abiaterone Acetate for the
Treatment of Men with Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer, 16 EXPERT OPINION
ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 473-85 (Mar. 2015)).
226. Id
227. Id. (discussing Schrader et al. study where 48.6% of patients who took other two
drugs were completely resistant to Xtandi) (citing Andres Jan Schrader et al., Enzalutamide in
Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer Patients Progressing After Docetaxel and Abiraterone, 65
EUR. UROLOGY 30 (2014)).
228. Id. at 2.
229. See Letter from U.S. Congress to Sylvia Burwell, Secretary, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., and Francis Collins, Director, Nat'l Inst. of Health (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/1 0/Doggett-5 I member-MarchlIn-
I 1Jan2016.pdf; see also Letter from U.S. Congress to Sylvia Burwell, Secretary, Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., and Francis Collins, Director, Nat'] Inst. of Health (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/congressional-letter-to-nih-and-hhs-
regarding-xtandi.pdf [hereinafter March Congressional Letter].
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A. Congressional Requests to NIH and HHS
Several days prior to the submission of the Xtandi petition, more
than fifty members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary Burwell of
HHS and Director Collins of NIH asking that the agencies use "[their]
existing statutory authority" under the Bayh-Dole Act to address
rising drug prices in the US. 230 The letter specifically suggested that
the NIH use its power to compel a patent holder of a federally-funded
new drug to issue its license to a third party in order to reduce
prices. 231 The congressmembers further requested that the agencies
offer greater guidance that better detail circumstances in which the
agencies would be willing to exercise their statutory authority since
they had declined to do so at every instance in the past.2 32 Their
premise was that if the agencies clarified the Act and their utilization
of the same, then pharmaceutical companies would feel increased
pressure to cease their price gouging practices because they would
know with greater specificity what constitutes egregious and
unreasonable drug pricing that would trigger agency intervention. 233
A few months later, on March 28, 2016, six members of the
House of Representatives, this time joined by six Senators, wrote
again to the Secretary and Director. 234 The letter called for the NIH to
conduct a public hearing concerning the Xtandi petition, similar to the
one previously granted by the agency in 2004 when it was
determining whether to exercise its march-in rights for the pricing of
Norvir. 2 35 They reiterated the agencies' long-standing, yet unused,
authority under the Act, and argued that drug pricing can be an
impediment to access and thus prices should be considered when
deciding a drug's availability on reasonable terms.236
Additionally, during the first-half of 2016, lawmakers took
advantage of opportunities to question both Secretary Burwell and
Director Collins regarding their respective agencies' stance on the
Xtandi petition and their authority under the Bayh-Dole Act while





234. March Congressional Letter, supra note 229.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See Department ofHealth and Human Services FY 2017 Budget Request: Hearing
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congressmen much help, though, but rather kept conversation on the
topic to a bare minimum. Further discussion on their responses is
addressed below.
B. Xtandi Petition to NIH DoD, and HHS under Bayh-Dole
As aforementioned, KEI and the UACT sent a petition to NIH,
DoD, and HIHS in January 2016 urging the agencies to use the
statutory rights granted to them under the Bayh-Dole Act and force
Xtandi to be manufactured at a reasonable price that would not inhibit
access of the drug by cancer patients. First, the petition asked that the
agencies exercise their royalty-free rights in the three patents for the
drug as listed in the FDA Orange Book or, in the alternative, grant the
organizations' petition for march-in rights.238 Second, the petition
more broadly requested the agencies to implement policy for the
utilization of royalty-free rights or march-in rights in cases of
egregious drug pricing by pharmaceutical companies, such as when
"prices in the United States are excessive, and/or higher than they are
- - *,239in high income foreign countries."
The petition emphasized the exorbitant price of Xtandi in the
United States compared to other similarly situated countries, asserting
that Astellas was taking advantage of the US drug market in its
pricing of Xtandi because of the federal agencies' repeated refusal to
step in.240 It also highlighted the toll that the price was taking on the
cancer patients that needed access to the drug and on the American
taxpayer through Medicare payments. Moreover, the petition
underscored the unreasonableness of allowing Astellas to sell Xtandi
in the United States at the highest price point in the world when it was
the United States that provided the funding for the research and
development of the drug. 241 Excessive pricing of federally funded
inventions, it argued, was exactly what the Bayh-Dole Act was
intended to protect against and such pricing should be taken into
account when deciding whether it is available to the public on
reasonable terms.242
Before H Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. (2016); see also Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agency Appropnations for 2017:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. (2016).
238. Xtandi Petition, supra note 161, at 2.
239. Id
240. Id. at 4.




1. Offer by Generic Manufacturer
Also of note is an April 22, 2016 offer from the President of
Biolyse Pharma to Director Collins and the Administrator for the
Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to manufacture
the generic version of Xtandi (enzalutamide) for $3.00 per pill.24 3
Biolyse Pharma is a Canadian drug company that specializes in
developing and manufacturing cancer treatment drugs. 244 In her offer
letter, the president of the company stated that if NIH exercised its
march-in rights on Xtandi, Biolyse could have the generic version of
the drug FDA approved within three years and supply the generic to
Medicare at a mere four percent of the price that Astellas had Xtandi
set for Medicare in 2014.245 If accepted, Biolyse's pricing offer would
have the potential to save the United States government over $57,000
246annually per patient.
C Government Responses
Secretary Burwell first acknowledged receipt of the January 1 1 th
Congressional letter when Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.)
pointedly asked her about it while she was testifying before the House
Ways and Means Committee nearly a month later on February 10,
2016.247 When Representative Doggett inquired about the
consideration the letter had received, Secretary Burwell responded:
"Your letter we have received, thank you, and we are continuing to
try and pursue every administrative option. We've proposed
legislative and statutory changes as a part of the budget, but are
looking at a wide array, of which we welcome your letter and your
suggestions." 248
243. Letter from Brigitte Kiecken, President, Biolyse Pharma, to Andy Slavitt, Acting
Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.keionline
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/1 0/BiolysePharma-letter-CMS-22April2Ol6.pdf
244. Overview, BIOLYSE PHARMA, http://www.biolyse.com/english.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2017).
245. Zach Struver, Biolyse Pharma Offers to Supply Enzalutamide (Xtandi) for $3 per
pill to Medicare and Developing Countries, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://keionline.org/node/2480.
246. Alfred B. Engelberg & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Use the Bayh-Dole Act to Lower
DrugPrices for Government Healthcare Programs, 22 NATURE MED. 576 (2016).
247. John M. Clerici & Phillip Bradley, Federal Govemment Won't March In When It
Comes to Drug Prices, LAw 360 (July 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/815909
/federal-gov-t-won-t-march-in-when-it-comes-to-drug-prices.
248. Id; Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 237.
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However, an official response from the Secretary came by way
of a letter on March 2, 2016. In it, she declined the Congressional
request for clarification and guidance on the Act, stating that "after
consulting with the NIH, we believe the statutory criteria are
sufficiently clear and additional guidance is not needed." 24 9 She
further added that the NIH evaluated the decision to exercise its
statutory march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act on a "case-by-case
basis" and would march in "if presented with a case where the
statutory criteria are met regarding commercialization and use of an
NIH-funded, patented invention, and where march-in could in fact
alleviate health or safety needs of address a situation where effective
steps are not being taken to achieve practical application of the
inventions."2 50
Director Collins responded separately on March 16, 2016 at a
House Appropriations Committee hearing when questioned by
Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) after she renewed her pleas
for NIH to exercise march-in rights to combat rising drug prices of
federally funded drugs.251 Specifically, she asked the Director twice
to define the meaning of "reasonable terms."2 52 Without supplying
Representative DeLauro with an exact definition, Director Collins
instead circled back to Secretary Burwell's earlier response and
reiterated that the agency would march in if reasonable terms were
not met and that the agency made such a determination on a case-by-
b-253case basis.
The following month, when Director Collins was testifying
before a panel at a Senate Appropriations hearing, he encountered
further inquiry about drug pricing by Senator Richard Durbin (D-
Ill.).254 He seemed to take a step back this time, however, and told the
Senator that although the agency determined whether reasonable
terms were being met on a case-by-case basis, he had since had the
opportunity to review the Bayh-Dole Act and he was not under the
249. Letter from Sylvia M. Burwell, Secretary, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to
Lloyd Doggett, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 2016), http://freepdf
hosting.com/be7532cfc0.pdf.
250. Id
251. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agency Appropnations for 2017: Heanngs Before a Subcomm. of the H Comm. on
Appropriations, 114th Cong. 7 (2016).
252. Id at 25-26.
253. Id.
254. Jeannie Baumann, NHI Pulls Back on Using Bayh-Dole for Drug Picing,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.bna.com/nih-pulls-back-n57982069624/.
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impression that pricing was to be included as criteria for deciding
availability on reasonable terms. 25 5 He interpreted it, rather, to mean
that a "product was unavailable simply because it was not being
commercialized."2 56 The Director also mentioned he worried about
alienating the agency from the pharmaceutical industry and new
innovation by utilizing the Act.257
On June 7, 2016, Secretary Burwell wrote to Representative
Doggett to inform him that the agencies would not be holding a public
hearing regarding the Xtandi petition as the congressmen had
asked. 25 She declared that the NIH could acquire adequate
information by adhering to 37 CFR 401.6 and that it did not
necessitate conducting a public hearing.2 59
Finally, on June 20, 2016, Director Collins issued a response to
Andrew Goldman of KEI regarding the Xtandi petition.26o NIH
denied it on the grounds that it had found Xtandi to be "broadly
available as a prescription drug" and that the petition "provide[d] no
information and no information was identified from public sources to
suggest that enzalutamide is currently or will be in short supply."2 61
The Director had obviously adhered to the same premise that he had
espoused at the hearing several months prior when he indicated that
he did not believe that pricing should be taken into consideration
when determining availability on reasonable terms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The plain language and clear legislative intent of the Bayh-Dole
Act shows that the U.S. government has the right to march in and
license federally-funded inventions when those inventions are not
available to the public on reasonable terms, or if health and safety
needs require that licensing. In response to the current medicines
255. F. Y 2017 Budget for National Institutes of Health: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies, 1 l4th Cong. (2016) (statement of Francis Collins, Director, Nat'1 Inst. of Health).
256. Id.
257. Id
258. Letter from Sylvia M. Burwell, Secretary, Dept. of Health & Human Services, to
Lloyd Doggett, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (June 7, 2016).
259. Id.
260. See Letter from Francis S. Collins, Director, Nat'l Inst. of Health, to Andrew S.
Goldman, Counsel, Knowledge Ecology Int'l (June 20, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Final-Response-Goldman-6.20.2016.pdf.
261. Id. at 1.
[54:171216
2017] BETTER LATE THANNEVER 217
access crisis, as demonstrated by the exorbitant cost and limited
availability of the federally-funded medicine Xtandi, the U.S. needs to
finally exercise its rights that have lain dormant since the Act was
passed in 1980.
IL
